Search engine for discovering works of Art, research articles, and books related to Art and Culture
ShareThis
Javascript must be enabled to continue!

People Systematically Update Moral Judgments of Blame

View through CrossRef
Six experiments examine people's updating of blame judgments and test predictions developed from a socially-regulated blame perspective. According to this perspective, blame emerged in human history as a socially costly tool for regulating other’s behavior. Because it is costly for both blamers and violators, blame is typically constrained by requirements for “warrant”— evidence that one’s moral judgment is justified. This requirement motivates people to systematically process available causal and mental information surrounding a violation. That is, people are relatively calibrated and even-handed in utilizing evidence that either amplifies or mitigates blame. Such systematic processing should be particularly visible when people update their moral judgments. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we test two sets of predictions derived from the socially-regulated blame perspective and compare them with predictions from a motivated-blame perspective. Studies 1-4 demonstrate (across student, internet, and community samples) that moral perceivers systematically grade updated blame judgments in response to the strength of new causal and mental information, without anchoring on initial evaluations. Further, these studies reveal that perceivers update blame judgments symmetrically in response to exacerbating and mitigating information, inconsistent with motivated-blame predictions. Study 5 shows that graded and symmetric blame updating is robust under cognitive load. Lastly, Study 6 demonstrates that biases can emerge once the social requirement for warrant is relaxed—as in the case of judging outgroup members. We conclude that social constraints on blame judgments render the normal process of blame well calibrated to causal and mental information, and biases may appear when such constraints are absent.
Title: People Systematically Update Moral Judgments of Blame
Description:
Six experiments examine people's updating of blame judgments and test predictions developed from a socially-regulated blame perspective.
According to this perspective, blame emerged in human history as a socially costly tool for regulating other’s behavior.
Because it is costly for both blamers and violators, blame is typically constrained by requirements for “warrant”— evidence that one’s moral judgment is justified.
This requirement motivates people to systematically process available causal and mental information surrounding a violation.
That is, people are relatively calibrated and even-handed in utilizing evidence that either amplifies or mitigates blame.
Such systematic processing should be particularly visible when people update their moral judgments.
Using a novel experimental paradigm, we test two sets of predictions derived from the socially-regulated blame perspective and compare them with predictions from a motivated-blame perspective.
Studies 1-4 demonstrate (across student, internet, and community samples) that moral perceivers systematically grade updated blame judgments in response to the strength of new causal and mental information, without anchoring on initial evaluations.
Further, these studies reveal that perceivers update blame judgments symmetrically in response to exacerbating and mitigating information, inconsistent with motivated-blame predictions.
Study 5 shows that graded and symmetric blame updating is robust under cognitive load.
Lastly, Study 6 demonstrates that biases can emerge once the social requirement for warrant is relaxed—as in the case of judging outgroup members.
We conclude that social constraints on blame judgments render the normal process of blame well calibrated to causal and mental information, and biases may appear when such constraints are absent.

Related Results

Basic Blame and Basic Praise
Basic Blame and Basic Praise
Abstract This chapter defends an account of what the blameworthy and praiseworthy are worthy of: basic blame and basic praise. Given the wide variety of responses th...
A Critique of Principlism
A Critique of Principlism
Photo by Towfiqu barbhuiya on Unsplash INTRODUCTION Bioethics does not have an explicitly stated and agreed upon means of resolving conflicts between normative theories. As such, b...
Escaping the Shadow
Escaping the Shadow
Photo by Karl Raymund Catabas on Unsplash The interests of patients at most levels of policymaking are represented by a disconnected patchwork of groups … “After Buddha was dead, ...
Moral Epistemology
Moral Epistemology
Moral epistemology is the study of moral knowledge and related phenomena. The recorded history of work in the field extends (at least) 2,500 years to Socrates’s inquiries into whet...
Morality and ethics
Morality and ethics
Morality is a distinct sphere within the domain of normative thinking about action and feeling (see Normativity); the whole domain, however, is the subject of ethics. How ...
Pragmatics of Political Blame in British and Iraqi Parliaments
Pragmatics of Political Blame in British and Iraqi Parliaments
This research is a pragmatic study of political blame in British and Iraqi Parliaments. It aims to unfold the similarities and/or differences in terms of the pragmatic and pragma-r...
Moral epistemology
Moral epistemology
Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. So moral epistemology is the study of what would be involved in knowing, or being justified in believing, moral proposi...
Ordinary ethical navigation. An account of moral understanding
Ordinary ethical navigation. An account of moral understanding
This dissertation defends an account of moral understanding as the competence to navigate ethical life. The nature of moral understanding is an object of controversy. Some claim th...

Back to Top