CHAPTER 12 Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle?

Abstract Frege maintains that two name‐containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a = a and a = b, can both be made true by the same object's self‐identity but nonetheless differ in their epistemic profiles. According to Frege, sentences of the form a = a are knowable a priori and uninformative; those of the form a = b are often informative, and cannot always be known to be true a priori. Frege solves his puzzle by locating a source for this purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences: the distinct Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. Thus, Frege portrays himself as describing a puzzle that arises independently of any particular theoretical position regarding names, and then solving that puzzle with the theoretical apparatus of Sinn and Bedeutung. This chapter argues that Frege's presentation is problematic. If an attempt is made to characterize the epistemic status of true identity sentences without appeal to Frege's theoretical commitments, then what initially seemed puzzling, largely dissolves. It turns out that, in order to generate his puzzle, Frege must invoke that which he seeks to establish the necessity of: the theoretical account of Sinn.