Finish what we Started

Abstract This chapter maintains that Zimbabwean coup-makers’ diplomacy altered the responses of external actors to the 2017 coup. However, the chapter’s argument on this point emphasizes that the coup-makers’ alteration of the reactions of external actors was only partially successful. The responses of African leaders to Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup were individually complex and not uniform. At best, coup-makers’ diplomacy divided views on how the AU should respond to the Zimbabwean coup, and this went some way towards ensuring a disjointed and ineffectual response by the AU leadership. The chapter also argues that particular internal characteristics of the AU were fertile ground for Zimbabwean coup-makers’ diplomacy. These internal factors were not part of Zimbabwean generals’ calculations, underlining the importance of fortuna in coup success. Finally, the chapter argues that SADC did not necessarily support the coup. Instead, Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup exposed how SADC is ill equipped for responding timeously to complicated and rapidly unfolding political crises