Javascript must be enabled to continue!
Causation, further themes
View through CrossRef
The traditional focus of philosophical interest in causation has been token causation: the kind of causation that relates particular dated events. There has been controversy in recent times over the nature of such events. Donald Davidson proposed that events are concrete particulars: like objects, they have spatio-temporal locations, identity conditions, and can be described in many different ways. However, most philosophers espouse one or other property-based conception of events in order to capture the idea that causation relates events in virtue of properties associated with those events.
More generally, philosophers have usually been concerned to provide a priori analyses of the concept of causation, though recently some have attempted to provide empirical analyses by investigating what physics says about the processes underlying causal relations. A recent much-discussed conceptual analysis of causation is David Lewis’s counterfactual theory. This theory ingeniously elaborates the idea that an event c causes an event e just when it is true that if c had not occurred e would not have occurred. However, the theory encounters difficulty explaining examples of pre-emption in which there are several possible causal pathways leading to some effect, only one of which goes through to completion.
Such examples highlight the centrality of the idea of a process to the concept of causation. A recent functionalist theory attempts to capture this fact by defining causation as the intrinsic relation that typically accompanies a counterfactual dependence of one event on a distinct event. Such a theory takes the existence of a counterfactual dependence to be a defeasible marker of the presence of the structural feature of reality that is the causal relation. While it has some success explaining examples of pre-emption, this functionalist theory has been criticised on the grounds that causation is not a relation at all, as evidenced by causal statements involving absences and omissions as causes or effects. The question whether it is possible to give a full conceptual analysis of causation is the subject of a currently vigorous philosophical debate.
Title: Causation, further themes
Description:
The traditional focus of philosophical interest in causation has been token causation: the kind of causation that relates particular dated events.
There has been controversy in recent times over the nature of such events.
Donald Davidson proposed that events are concrete particulars: like objects, they have spatio-temporal locations, identity conditions, and can be described in many different ways.
However, most philosophers espouse one or other property-based conception of events in order to capture the idea that causation relates events in virtue of properties associated with those events.
More generally, philosophers have usually been concerned to provide a priori analyses of the concept of causation, though recently some have attempted to provide empirical analyses by investigating what physics says about the processes underlying causal relations.
A recent much-discussed conceptual analysis of causation is David Lewis’s counterfactual theory.
This theory ingeniously elaborates the idea that an event c causes an event e just when it is true that if c had not occurred e would not have occurred.
However, the theory encounters difficulty explaining examples of pre-emption in which there are several possible causal pathways leading to some effect, only one of which goes through to completion.
Such examples highlight the centrality of the idea of a process to the concept of causation.
A recent functionalist theory attempts to capture this fact by defining causation as the intrinsic relation that typically accompanies a counterfactual dependence of one event on a distinct event.
Such a theory takes the existence of a counterfactual dependence to be a defeasible marker of the presence of the structural feature of reality that is the causal relation.
While it has some success explaining examples of pre-emption, this functionalist theory has been criticised on the grounds that causation is not a relation at all, as evidenced by causal statements involving absences and omissions as causes or effects.
The question whether it is possible to give a full conceptual analysis of causation is the subject of a currently vigorous philosophical debate.
Related Results
Analytical causation in Islamic philosophy
Analytical causation in Islamic philosophy
Analytical causation is a type of causation that is often overlooked in philosophical textbooks. This type of causation is contrasted with external causation. In modern times, cont...
Causation and Counterfactuals
Causation and Counterfactuals
One philosophical approach to causation sees counterfactual dependence as the key to the explanation of causal facts: for example, events c (the cause) and e (the effect) both occu...
Evolutionary Causation
Evolutionary Causation
A comprehensive treatment of the concept of causation in evolutionary biology that makes clear its central role in both historical and contemporary debates.
Most sci...
Causation, Indian theories of
Causation, Indian theories of
Causation was acknowledged as one of the central problems in Indian philosophy. The classical Indian philosophers’ concern with the problem basically arose from two sources: first,...
Chancy Causation in Tort
Chancy Causation in Tort
This Essay demonstrates that the causation inquiry in tort law, at least where causation is chancy, is largely a normative inquiry. Chancy causation is where the cause of an event ...
Causation and Observation
Causation and Observation
Abstract
This article briefly discusses Hume's original argument concerning the absence of a sensory impression of causation. Hume's argument is important not just b...
Causation, in modern philosophy
Causation, in modern philosophy
The new science of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sparked intense reflection and theorizing on the nature of causation. Philosophers attempted to account for the nature of...

