Essence and Dependence

I argue that Kit Fine’s essence-based account of ontological dependence is subject to various counterexamples. I first discuss Fine’s distinctive “schema-based” approach to metaphysical theorizing, which aims to identify general principles accommodating any intelligible application of the metaphysical notion(s) at issue. I then raise concerns about the general principles Fine takes to schematically characterize the notions of essence and dependence, which principles enter into his account of ontological dependence. The problem, roughly speaking, is that Fine supposes that an object’s essence makes reference just to what it ontologically depends on, but various cases suggest that an object’s essence can also make reference to what ontologically depends on it. As such, Fine’s essence-based account of ontological dependence is subject to the same objection he raises against modal accounts of essence and dependence—that is, of being insufficiently ecumenical.