The 1909–1912 Intervention in Nicaragua

This chapter contains the second case study of US regime change in the Western Hemisphere—the intervention in Nicaragua from 1909 to 1912 under US president William Howard Taft. The chapter explores the decision-making process within the Taft administration vis-à-vis Nicaragua and compares it to US-Nicaragua relations under Taft’s presidential predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt. Tracing emotional frustration in the Taft administration, the chapter shows how Taft extended US expectations toward Nicaragua, how his perceptions of Nicaraguan obstruction were more negative than Roosevelt’s, and how negative affect dominated his government’s decision-making. Emotional frustration outlived the presidency of Nicaraguan president José Zelaya, prompting Taft to target his successor, José Madriz, and a following insurrection led by Luis Mena. The chapter ends with a critical review of five alternative explanations for the Taft government’s intervention in Nicaragua.