Mādhava’s Garland of Jaimini’s Reasons as Exemplary Mīmāṃsā Philosophy

This chapter examines the Jaiminīyanyāyamālā (Garland of Jaimini’s Reasons) of Mādhava (1297–1388) as an example of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. It asks what Mīmāṃsā thinkers find philosophically problematic or interesting in the Sūtra before discussing what in Mīmāṃsā is most properly and usefully characterized as “Mīmāṃsā philosophy.” It considers the traditional themes thought to characterize each Adhyāya, or book, of the Sūtra to show that Mīmāṃsā reading and reasoning is grounded in case-studies and that it is like another form of textual reasoning, that of rabbinic tradition. In particular, it analyzes Jacob Neusner’s views on whether Mishnah, or any similar system, is philosophical. The chapter proceeds by turning to the Garland and Mādhava’s purpose in this work. It compares the Garland to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and argues that Mādhava is a philosopher of a certain kind, and his Garland a philosophical text committed to rational inquiry.