Escalation Dynamics in Cyberspace

Abstract This book challenges the conventional wisdom that cyberspace is a dangerous environment prone to escalation. It offers a theoretical framework to explain the general absence of cyber escalation that draws on core conceptions in security studies and extends their logic to the cyber domain. It also draws on central characteristics of cyber operations, arguing that they mitigate pathways to escalation and dampen the potential for intensification of strategic interactions between rival states. The theory’s logic is extended to explore the conditions under which cyber operations could contribute to the de-escalation of crises and articulate a proposition for specific scenarios in which escalation could nevertheless occur. The book offers a comprehensive perspective on the nature of cyber escalation, from competition to crisis and conflict. As well as interrogating long-held assumptions about escalation in cyberspace, it also reframes the conversation away from binary debates about whether or not escalation is probable to identifying the conditions under which escalation—or de-escalation—may be more or less likely. It assesses cyber behavior in the context of a number of different crises and strategic rivalries, particularly several dyads involving the United States and its rivals. This is important as there are direct, significant implications for states that may discount, overestimate, or miscalculate the risks of operating in and through cyberspace. The book concludes with policy recommendations, focusing on the implications for U.S. cyber strategy and operations.