Reimagining special economic zones in international economic law: from regulatory management to experimental governance

ABSTRACT This article examines the evolving role of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) within the framework of International Economic Law (IEL), particularly amid the decline of multilateralism and the rise of regulatory experimentation. SEZs, exemplified by Asia’s dominance in their proliferation, are increasingly seen as both catalysts for economic development and disruptors of global trade norms, such as World Trade Organization subsidy rules. The analysis employs Andrew Lang’s framework of interface and convergence approaches to navigate the paradoxes of SEZs’ legal positioning. The interface approach tolerates institutional diversity by translating regulatory differences into technical legal categories, while the convergence approach seeks harmonization through neoliberal regulatory alignment. However, both frameworks are critiqued for their managerialist focus on containing diversity. The article argues that China’s Pilot Free Trade Zones (PFTZs) epitomize an emerging experimentalist turn in IEL, where SEZs serve as laboratories for localized legal innovation. By ‘docking’ international standards through iterative adaptation and multi-stakeholder engagement, PFTZs redefine diversity as a generative resource rather than a problem. This shift reflects IEL’s broader transition from rigid rule-based governance to context-specific, adaptive frameworks capable of addressing fragmented global challenges. The study concludes that SEZs, particularly China’s model, highlight the need for IEL to embrace institutional experimentation, fostering resilience amid geopolitical and economic uncertainties.