Either You Know or You've Gotta Believe

The standard analysis of knowledge in contemporary epistemology is the view that a subject \(S\) knows a proposition \(p\) iff 1.) \(p\) is true; 2.) \(S\) believes that \(p\); 3.) \(S\) is justified in believing that \(p\). Hence, knowledge is justified true belief (JTB)1. The second condition that (propositional) knowledge entails belief is called the entailment thesis and has been considered by the majority as uncontroversial. Numerous accounts of knowledge and belief have been constructed involving entailment thesis granting it a default status. The generally accepted view in today's epistemology is that knowledge is something more than 'merely' belief. Few philosophers argued against the entailment thesis, even if barely any arguments for it have been presented. Some of the earlier voices in contemporary epistemology arguing against the entailment thesis and for the superiority of belief were Colin Radford's and Bernard Williams'. Today Blake Myers-Schulz and Eric Schwitzgebel as well as Dylan Murray, Justin Sytsma and Jonathan Livengood provide convincing arguments disputing the rightfulness of the entailment thesis. In what follows I will discuss different accounts of knowledge and belief and point out the overlooked connection between these accounts and argue that it supports yet another line of argument against the entailment thesis. I will further argue that knowledge and belief are two separate concepts, neither of which can be defined in terms of the other, and that it is a belief that is more complex and requires further conditions than knowledge, most of all agent's actions.