Secrets vs. Lies

The traditional way of stating the common view of the moral asymmetry between keeping secrets and lying is that keeping secrets is prima facie morally permissible, whereas lying is prima facie morally wrong. This chapter argues that the correct way of stating the common view is that both keeping secrets and lying are prima facie morally wrong, but lying is worse than keeping secrets, all things being equal. The author draws upon the work of Thomas Nagel and compares candor, non-acknowledgment, informativeness, and reticence with secrecy, and compares secrecy with deception and lying. It is argued that keeping secrets must be distinguished from being reticent, and that understood this way, it is clear that it is prima facie wrong to keep secrets. Having the correct way of stating the common view of the moral asymmetry between keeping secrets and lying will allow us to evaluate the common view.