Constraining Maximization

Abstract Gauthier takes his starting point for a theory of obligation the prisoner’s dilemma. That dilemma illustrates the problem of providing the rationale for obligation, since without a rational precept that agents have to keep their word, no social contract is credible. Gauthier’s aim is to show that duty overrides advantage, so that the acceptance of duty is truly advantageous. His key insight is that agents can escape the trap of the prisoner’s dilemma, provided that they think of their individual choices as a fair optimizing response to the choices of others. This distinguished straightforward maximizers, who would defect in a prisoner’s dilemma, from constrained maximizers, who would cooperate. Constrained maximizers have a disposition to cooperate, because they recognize the importance of being admitted into society. However, to make his solution work, Gauthier requires a heterodox distinction between choice and preference. Of itself, this is reasonable. However, the argument falters at the point at which it infers from the need for contractual association that such association will be coextensive with society at large, when it may be more restricted than that. Moreover, the strategy of a fair response is incompatible with Gauthier’s claim that his theory is non-tuistic, as well as the claim that affective morality can be internal and disposition, rather than requiring governance.