Causally Driven Analogs

In chapter 8, the author brings causal, teleosemantic and resemblance theories of content together by extending CT (as presented in chapter 7) to explain how homomorphism (more specifically, analog relations, or second-order similarity relations) can play a content-constitutive role. While the idea that some systems have the function to model the world might explain why a natural representational system counts as a representational system, it is neutral between iconic mental representation and a more language-like version of Mentalese. The author then addresses traditional objections to resemblance theories of content, to show how they can now be met. She argues that sensory-perceptual systems can have functions to produce inner state changes that are caused by and the analogs of their contents, and that this casts light on the intuitive appeal of resemblance theories of mental representation, and that it permits some sensory-perceptual simples to represent novel and non-existent contents. Chapter 8 also addresses the fourth and fifth content-determinacy challenges: why does R have the content there’s C and not there’s Q, when (iv) C is a determinate of Q, or (v) C is a determinable for Q? In the last few sections, Berkeley’s problem of abstraction and two contemporary strategies for its solution are discussed, insofar as it concerns the representation of perceptible properties (e.g., shape and color).