A Mark of the Mental

How do thoughts get to be about the world, how do they refer to their contents? This book tackles the most tractable part of this ancient problem by offering a theory of original intentionality for (nonconceptual) sensory-perceptual representations. To pave the way, Neander discusses the role played by the notions of representation and representational content in cognitive science, and explain how it stems from combining a standard biological strategy for explaining how bodies and brains operate or function with a mainstream information-processing approach to explaining cognitive (including perceptual) capacities. The author also argues that this supports an informational version of teleosemantics, and develops the theory of content in three stages. First she elucidates how sensory-perceptual systems have response functions, and why the sensory-perceptual representations they produce may be said to refer to the causes in response to which they are, in that sense, supposed to be produced. Second, she explains how sensory-perceptual systems might therefore have functions to produce inner state changes that are both caused by and the analogs of their contents, and thus how analog relations (i.e., relations of second-order similarity) as well as causal-information relations can be content-constitutive. Finally, she discusses the notorious problem of distal content and offers a solution that ismost suited for (nonconceptual) sensory-perceptual representations. Along the way, the author solves six aspects of the content-indeterminacy problem.