Conclusion

This chapter concludes the book by reinterpreting Ba’thist Iraq as a counter-insurgency state. It shows that Saddam’s polies resembles those of the counter-insurgency campaign launched by the American military in Iraq during the 2000s. American counter-insurgency theory relies heavily on the ideas of David Galula, who in turn relied heavily on Mao. Saddam also relied on Mao’s ideas about insurgency and counter-insurgency. Thus, both Saddam and the Americans attempted to build a political order in Iraq from the ground up. However, there were differences between Saddam’s polices and those of the Americans. For example, Saddam resorted to much higher levels of violence. The chapter ends by stating that Iraq’s future leader will also need to build a political order from the ground up to stabilize the country. The question is if that leader will be able to do so without resorting to the violence that typified Saddam’s rule.