Time

Abstract This chapter discusses the manner in which Kant deems temporality to be a threat to rational agency. The discussion of imputation in the previous chapter sheds light on Kant’s belief that imputable acts originate from agents through non-temporal causal powers. Understanding why temporal causes are incompatible with rational determination is crucial for comprehending Kant’s rejection of the compatibility between temporal causality and control. While Kant’s position may appear puzzling, there are plausible explanations for his stance. This chapter argues that Kant rejects temporal causality because temporal determination follows receptive, not spontaneous, causal laws—making it incompatible with the rational self-determination required for moral agency. This interpretation challenges both compatibilist readings that view Kant as accepting predeterministic freedom and libertarian interpretations that attribute agent-causal indeterminism to him. Instead, the chapter defends a reading of Kant as maintaining a consistent compatibilist position throughout his career, where freedom requires necessitation by rational rather than temporal causal laws. The argument demonstrates that Kant’s Critical philosophy preserves his pre-Critical commitment to rational determination while rejecting the temporal framework that previously seemed compatible with it.