COVID-19 government support reinforces zombification

We investigate the effect of government support on firm zombification during the COVID-19 crisis for Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States. For this purpose, we use a simple model that links insolvency developments at the macro level to GDP developments. We first observe from the data that insolvencies have declined during the crisis despite economic contraction. We then use the model to calculate the total firms saved from insolvency by government intervention and the fraction of which are not healthy, the zombies. It appears that government intervention has been effective in saving firms during the height of the crisis in Q2 of 2020. The impact is smaller in Q3 when the recovery set in. But it comes at a cost of efficiency as it causes significantly higher zombification in the economy. The effect can be seen in both quarters, most notably in Belgium. In Germany and the Netherlands, zombification was low in Q2 but soared in Q3. The reverse effect was visible in Spain as the number of insolvencies picked up in Q3. Therefore, government intervention during the crisis has reinforced the existing trend of zombification there. With government support only gradually withdrawing in the recovery phase of the crisis and probably further pushing up the number of zombie firms, risk management faces the challenging task of detecting them. We offer a few suggestions. These are based on the classification of zombies, including ICR and Tobin’s q, as well as research on underlying drivers. Compared to the sector median, zombies appear smaller, less productive, slower growing, with lower investments and higher leverage despite higher equity issues and implied interest rate subsidies. Complementary to this market-based information, more proprietary, higher frequency data such as payment behaviours, revenue growth pace change, credit sourcing, bank covenant compliance and management competencies can be monitored using scorecards. Finally, we recommend a high level of vigilance and an additional provisioning to anticipate any delayed effects of the crisis.