Deliberative Democracy Without Deliberation

Proponents and critics of deliberative democracy alike often interpret the theory as revolving around the implementation of a practice of deliberation as modelled on the idealistic standard of Jürgen Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’. As well as an explosion of deliberative mini-publics in practice, such as citizens’ assemblies, this interpretation has given rise to a long-standing critique of deliberative democracy as setting a rigid, idealistic and exclusionary standard that undermines democratic politics more than advancing it. Unpacking the conceptual distinction between deliberation as a practice-to-be-implemented and deliberative democracy as a wider theory of legitimacy, here I present an alternative interpretation of Habermasian deliberative democracy as a political culture oriented toward resisting domination, to which a practice of deliberation modelled on the ideal speech situation is neither necessary nor conducive. Rather than orchestrating deliberation in this alleged textbook sense, deliberative democrats ought to nurture a general critical-democratic political culture in both the practice and the ongoing theoretical development of deliberative democracy.