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Hume on Pride and the Other Indirect Passions
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In the Treatise, Hume focuses on pride as an “indirect passion,” one indicative of self-valuing and moral virtue and contributing positively to our sense of who we are and, in particular, to our moral identity. This essay examines those features of pride that make Hume’s account of the indirect passions so distinctive, beginning with an examination of his application of the experimental method to explain the origin of the indirect passions and the double relation of ideas and impressions as the efficient causes of these passions. Also examined is the relationship Hume draws between the principle of sympathy, pride, and the causes of pride; the relations among pride in virtuous character, moral confidence and, competence; and Hume’s account of pride in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Finally, the author considers the view of Humean moral agency as heteronomous in nature.
Title: Hume on Pride and the Other Indirect Passions
Description:
In the Treatise, Hume focuses on pride as an “indirect passion,” one indicative of self-valuing and moral virtue and contributing positively to our sense of who we are and, in particular, to our moral identity.
This essay examines those features of pride that make Hume’s account of the indirect passions so distinctive, beginning with an examination of his application of the experimental method to explain the origin of the indirect passions and the double relation of ideas and impressions as the efficient causes of these passions.
Also examined is the relationship Hume draws between the principle of sympathy, pride, and the causes of pride; the relations among pride in virtuous character, moral confidence and, competence; and Hume’s account of pride in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.
Finally, the author considers the view of Humean moral agency as heteronomous in nature.
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