A Daoist Critique of Morality

Abstract A striking passage from the Daoist classic Zhuangzi likens devoting oneself to benevolence and righteousness and seeking to distinguish right from wrong to suffering the ancient Chinese corporal punishments of tattooing the face and amputating the nose. Common-sense morality is not merely a mistake, the passage implies. It mutilates people, leaving them blind to the features by which to navigate the Way. This astonishing rejection not just of a particular understanding of morality but of the very idea of morality as a guide to action is representative of an intriguing thread of discourse that winds through several classical Chinese philosophical anthologies. According to this discourse, benevolence and righteousness obscure the Way and impair one’s ability to follow it. They are a sign of pathology: they interfere with people’s spontaneous capacities, are redundant, and are an obstacle to adroit action. This chapter aims to elucidate these themes, explain their significance in the context of early Chinese ethics, and relate them to ethical discourse today. It explains how, given early Daoists’ understanding of the structure of action and of the factors that guide it, their critique may be surprisingly plausible. The chapter attempts briefly to situate the Daoist critique in relation to well-known “morality critics” in the West, including contemporary writers such as Nagel, Wolf, and Williams and 19th-century figures such as Nietzsche and James. It then considers potential objections to the Daoist position and tentatively suggests how Daoists might respond.