Post-conflict institutional engineering and political representation in Burundi

Power sharing, in its various forms, has become the main approach of conflict-regulation in divided societies, that is, societies where ‘us against them’ organizes political competition. It is used to resolve post-electoral conflicts, to end violent identity-based conflicts, and/or to ensure political representation of politically salient groups. Burundi, the focus of this research, has mobilized ethnic power-sharing to end an ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, the two main ethnic groups in the country. This research aims to uncover the institutional architecture and lifecycle of power sharing in Burundi, examine whether (and how) the evolution of power dynamics influenced political power-sharing practices in Burundi, and explore whether (and how) power-sharing institutions shape citizens’ perceptions and experiences of political representation. To achieve these goals, it relies on an original dataset of individuals who held important state positions between 1988 and 2023 and life histories. It discusses, inter alia, the conditions under which power-sharing became adoptable. It shows that a mutually hurting stalemate was key to the signature of a power-sharing agreement in Burundi. However, the durability of this agreement has owed much to the adaptability of its design. A changing political context has affected the real-life implementation of the initial arrangements. Dominant political actors have taken advantage of loopholes in the design and monopolized strategic and high salience political positions. Hence, the power-sharing system has mimicked the predecessor regimes in terms of instrumentalization of regionalism, domination of male politicians, and blurring lines between military and political establishments. This research argues that the evolution of ethnic power-sharing is a function of a larger pattern of strategies to control power, in light of long-standing patron-client dynamics, single party culture, civil-military relations and regional power imbalances. While power-sharing can be a strong tool to end protracted conflicts (even in hard cases like Burundi), its transformative potential can be limited.