Mindreading beliefs in same- and cross-neurotype interactions

A large sample of autistic and non-autistic adults was recruited to investigate whether self-reported beliefs about their own and other people’s mindreading abilities were in line with either mindreading deficit accounts of autism or the double empathy problem (DEP) (which proposes mindreading difficulties are relational in autism). Three hundred and forty-eight (139 autistic) participants completed an online questionnaire which asked about autism identification and diagnostic status and their beliefs about their own mindreading abilities in relation to autistic and non-autistic others, and about autistic and non-autistic others’ abilities to read their (the participant’s) own minds. While autistic participants did report weaker mindreading abilities, this was only true in relation to non-autistic others. Both groups reported better mindreading abilities in same- than other-neurotype interactions, with autistic participants reporting mindreading abilities commensurate with non-autistic participants in relation to autistic targets. The same pattern was found when participants were asked about other people’s mindreading abilities. The findings were more consistent with the DEP than deficit theories, as the target reference group strongly impacted participants’ perceived mindreading abilities. While self-reported beliefs do not necessarily reflect actual mindreading abilities, they may still have important consequences for intergroup relations and social outcomes for autistic people. Lay Abstract Autistic people are often characterised as having problems with mindreading, which refers to understanding other people’s thoughts, beliefs and feelings. However, it has recently been suggested that mindreading difficulties may be a two-way issue between autistic and non-autistic people. This would imply that autistic people may not have difficulty reading the minds of other autistic people, whereas non-autistic people may struggle to read autistic people effectively. In this study, we created a survey in which we asked a relatively large sample of autistic and non-autistic people to rate their own and others’ mindreading abilities in relation to autistic and non-autistic others, respectively. Both groups believed that they were better at reading others in their own group than the other group. The autistic respondents reported levels of mindreading skill at least commensurate with the non-autistic respondents when the mind to be read was specified as autistic. Thus, both groups of participants’ responses were consistent with the notion that mindreading abilities are relational. Although self-reports are subjective, such beliefs could have important consequences for well-being and intergroup relations.