Distal and Distant Red Squares

The final chapter is about the notoriously difficult problem of distal content (the sixth of the content determinacy challenges listed in chapter 7). In relation to causal theories of reference, the problem is to explain why a representation counts as representing its content, rather than some other item that carries information about it to the sensory-perceptual system that produces the representation. After discussing how the problem concerns nonconceptual representations, as opposed to conceptualized thought, the author offers a solution suitable for nonconceptual representations. She explains why several well-known proposals do not seem to be even designed to assign appropriate distal contents to nonconceptual representations (whatever their success might or might not be for concepts). Neander alsoalso discusses several closely related issues, such as how a hallucinated red square might be experienced as “in the world,” versus “just in the head,” and how distal contents and perceptual constancies are related. Before concluding, the author discusses the issue of how informational teleosemantics handles the content of complex contents produced by the so-called “binding” of perceived features to perceived objects.