“Yet Once More”: The Double-Slit Experiment and Quantum Discontinuity

This article reconsiders the double-slit experiment from the nonrealist or, in terms of this article, “reality-without-realism” (RWR) perspective, grounded in the combination of three forms of quantum discontinuity: (1) “Heisenberg discontinuity”, defined by the impossibility of a representation or even conception of how quantum phenomena come about, even though quantum theory (such as quantum mechanics or quantum field theory) predicts the data in question strictly in accord with what is observed in quantum experiments); (2) “Bohr discontinuity”, defined, under the assumption of Heisenberg discontinuity, by the view that quantum phenomena and the data observed therein are described by classical and not quantum theory, even though classical physics cannot predict them; and (3) “Dirac discontinuity” (not considered by Dirac himself, but suggested by his equation), according to which the concept of a quantum object, such as a photon or electron, is an idealization only applicable at the time of observation and not to something that exists independently in nature. Dirac discontinuity is of particular importance for the article’s foundational argument and its analysis of the double-slit experiment.