Distinct Neural Representations of Decision Uncertainty in Metacognition and Mentalizing

Abstract Metacognition and mentalizing are both associated with meta-level mental state representations. Specifically, metacognition refers to monitoring one’s own cognitive processes, while mentalizing refers to monitoring others’ cognitive processes. However, this self-other dichotomy is insufficient to delineate the two high-level mental processes. We here used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to systematically investigate the neural representations of different levels of decision uncertainty in monitoring different targets (the current self, the past self, and others) performing a perceptual decision-making task. Our results reveal diverse formats of intrinsic mental state representations of decision uncertainty in mentalizing, separate from the associations with external information. External information was commonly represented in the right inferior parietal lobe (IPL) across the mentalizing tasks. However, the meta-level mental states of decision uncertainty attributed to others were uniquely represented in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), rather than the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) that also equivalently represented the object-level mental states of decision inaccuracy attributed to others. Further, the object-level and meta-level mental states of decision uncertainty, when attributed to the past self, were represented in the precuneus and the lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), respectively. In contrast, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) consistently represented both decision uncertainty in metacognition and estimate uncertainty during monitoring the different mentalizing processes, but not the inferred decision uncertainty in mentalizing. Hence, our findings identify neural signatures to clearly delineate metacognition and mentalizing and further imply distinct neural computations on the mental states of decision uncertainty during metacognition and mentalizing.