Confessions

Abstract This chapter explores one of the oldest, most persuasive, and routinely problematic forms of judicial evidence: the accused’s confession. The common sense apprehension that full confessions are conclusive proof of guilt is challenged both by modern psychological research demonstrating the reality of false confessions and by the inherently coercive nature of criminal investigations creating pressures towards unreliable admissions. For a time, common lawyers conceptualized informal party admissions as falling within an exception to the hearsay rule (so long as they were ‘voluntary’), but their admissibility at trial is now governed in England and Wales by section 76 of PACE 1984. The institutional context of police interrogation is sketched, highlighting PACE Code C’s normative framework of detainee rights and the jurisprudential evolution and practical realties of suspects’ access to custodial legal advice, before turning to detailed evidentiary analysis. PACE 1984 s.76 establishes both an inclusionary basis for (partly) ‘adverse’ statements, and two primary exclusionary rules targeting (a) oppression and (b) circumstances conducive to unreliability. In neither case is the truth of the confession decisive. Confessions are inadmissible unless the prosecutor can disprove (a) and/or (b), whenever either is raised on the facts, beyond reasonable doubt. The admissibility of contested confessions is determined on the voir dire (‘trial within a trial’). Doctrinal exposition critically examines procedural matters (e.g. Mushtaq directions), consequential discoveries (‘fruit of the poisoned tree’), admissibility jurisprudence interpreting section 76(2), special rules for vulnerable suspects (PACE 1984 s.77 directions), and confessions adduced by a co-accused (PACE 1984 s.76A).