Lze vynucovat některé mezinárodní závazky za použití síly?

This paper focused on the analysis of enforcement of state responsibility for breaches of some international obligations of an essential nature. These obligations relate to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the fight against international terrorism, and the protection of fundamental human rights. Ali such obligations are considered to be essential and relate to new security challenges; there are, however, certain differences among them when considering the structure of primary obligations and legal consequences of their breach. Treaties on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons, by their nature, encompass obligations erga omnes partes which are interlinked. A breach by one state changes the position of the other State Parties (all-or-nothing obligations). Although classic legal responsibility consequences of unlawful conduct may, due to their erga omnes partes nature, apply only with limitations, the respective regimes established by the treaties rely on special control mechanisms. Erga omnes partes obligations of an integral nature apply primarily in the area of human rights. Such obligations were adopted to protect collective interests. Unlike obligations resulting from disarmament treaties, they represent a different type of obligation. A state may not stop observing human rights due to another state’s violation (i.e. not use symmetric countermeasures). Other parties to such an obligation may, on the other hand, require the responsible state to cease unlawful conduct. This mostly applies only within control mechanisms of a judicial or other nature established by treaties. Obligations arising out of responsibility can be of an erga omnes nature only in the case of violation of human rights obligations created by peremptory norms of general international law. Where multilateral treaties on terrorism are at issue, obligations have a partly bilateral, partly integral obligation character (resembling human rights treaties in this respect). Should a breach occur this gives rise primarily to responsibility of a state inter partes. However, the respective treaties do not provide for a special institutionalised control regime, and in this they differ from the two above-mentioned groups. The gap has recently been filled by resolutions of the UN Security Council establishing obligations erga omnes the breach of which may give rise to responsibility under general international law of a similar nature. Enforcement of obligations relating to the prohibition and non-proliferation of WMD and the fight against terrorism does not require new individual coercive means. First, states may use countermeasures without the use of farce. Second, collective coercive measures may be sometimes used instead of individual means upon the recommendation or decision of a body of the respective international organisation. Third, the use of farce may serve as an extreme means of coercion if it has been so decided by the UN Security Council according to Chapter VII of the Charter. Fourth, should a serious and imminent threat occur states may not be deprived of the right to individua] or collective self-defence. The situation seems to be much more complicated in the case of extremely serious violations of erga omnes obligations to protect human rights. However, individual or collective countermeasures free from force may not be excluded although their efficiency is usually disputable. The Security Council has proven that such cases can be designated as a threat to peace under Chapter VII of the Charter. Its permission is required for states to intervene using force. However, the right to self-defence may not be invoked due to the substance of the issue. If force were used for humanitarian reasons to stop genocide or mass violation of basic human rights, or to enforce responsibility erga omnes, the existing international law does not permit the use of individua) armed countermeasures. Considering the issue from the point of view of international legal rules de lege lata, humanitarian intervention cannot yet be regarded as legal no matter what criteria for its legitimacy may exist. Instead, it is necessary to seek a strengthening of collective coercive mechanisms. Therefore the latest proposals of institutional reform of the UN, which result, among other things, from a newly defined responsibility to protect, could be very important.