Phenomenology and the Norms of Perception

Abstract In the philosophical literature, it is customary to think of perception as being assessable with respect to epistemic norms. For example, the whole discussion around disjunctivism, which is now often considered to be the dominant, if not the default, position in philosophy of perception, is framed and motivated by epistemological concerns about truth and falsity. This book argues that perception is normative in another, more fundamental, sense. Perception is governed by norms that I call perceptual, that is, immanent to its own structure. This does not mean that perceptual norms are cut off from external facts; rather, it means that they are constitutive moments of our experience of these facts. Perceptual norms are constitutive or enabling norms in that they establish what perception is. To articulate this, the book draws on the repertoire of the phenomenological tradition, in the work of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in particular. For both phenomenologists, perception obtains when it unfolds concordantly or coherently, and when the perceptual progression corresponds to one’s goal or interest, perception can also be said to be optimal. From the phenomenological point of view, concordance and optimality are the basic perceptual norms governing perceptual experience, and the book clarifies their meaning and addresses the philosophical consequences that follow. The first two chapters outline Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception, illusions, and hallucinations. The following five chapters put the author’s theory to test in the broader philosophical landscape by engaging in five ongoing debates in philosophy of mind and perception.