CONTEMPT POWER: A CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH IN BANGLADESH

So that the Court may perform its judicial function effectively, it is endowed with, inter alia, the power to punish for contempt of itself. This paper examines the Bangladesh Supreme Court’s exercise of its contempt power. In 2008, the Military backed care-taker government promulgated the Contempt of Courts Ordinance. The High Court Division (HCD) declared the Ordinance ultra vires in M Shamsul Haque vs. Bangladesh. Three years later in 2013, the Parliament passed the Contempt of Courts Act. This law was also declared void by the HCD in Asaduzzaman Siddiqui vs. The Secretary, Cabinet Division. Apart from these two cases, there are also other leading cases on Court’s contempt power. This paper generally aims to analyze and evaluate the significant contempt cases decided by the Supreme Court. The findings of the paper are two-fold: first, the Court’s approach both towards acts amounting to contempt of court and accepting the apology of the contemnor has been inconsistent, undefined and uncertain; second, the Court has failed to strike the right balance between the Court’s contempt power under Article 108 and the people’s right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press under Article 39(2) of the Constitution. This paper is an urge upon the Court to change its stance towards the archaic jurisdiction of contempt of court. The paper also submits and emphasises that in the interpretation involving freedom of expression vis-a-vis contempt of court, the Court should regard freedom of expression as the norm of which contempt of court should be a narrowly construed exception. Keywords: Contempt of Court, Freedom of Expression, Freedom of the Press, Acts Amounting to Contempt, Contemnor’s Apology, the Constitution of Bangladesh.