Justifying Unparticipated Causality in Proclus

Proclus introduces the concept of the unparticipated (ἀμέθεκτον) (P1) among two other terms— the participated (P2) and participant (P3)—as the first principle (ἀρχή) of any given series of entities or Forms in his metaphysical structure. For instance, the unparticipated monad (P1), Soul, generates all individual, participated souls (P2), which in turn generate the attribute of life in their respective, participating bodies (P3). Proclus looks at (P2) as an efficient cause of (P3), where (P2) must be the attribute in actuality in relation to the attribute it brings about in (P3). At the outset, this suggests that (P2) is necessary and sufficient for (P3), which then implies a problem for positing (P1): if (P2) is doing the causal legwork for (P3), what role does (P1) play? One of Proclus’ main explanations is that (P1) is responsible for ‘unifying’ the multiple participated entities (P2), so that the commonality of the participated entities (P2) must go back to a separate source (P1). However, one could easily respond that this just amounts to a reversion to a priori Platonist principles for transcendent, separate Forms without providing a real justification for the necessity of (P1) as a cause. In my talk, I wish to elaborate on how Proclus thinks about (P1)’s type of causation in relation to (P2) and (P3), particularly showing why (P2) for Proclus is ultimately insufficient as an efficient cause compared to (P1) as the absolute first cause for a given series.[Early work on a PhD thesis chapter — presentation for the University of Edinburgh, July 16, 2017. Any comments or feedback are welcome!]