Guilt is Ethical, Shame is Aesthetic

My hypothesis is that guilt pertains to the realm of ethics whereas shame pertains more to that of aesthetics. While guilt results from accusations of unlawful behavior, shame tends to be produced by pointing out how the transgressing individual “looks” within a certain social context. I show that a confusion of the ethical and aesthetic components has often given shame an unclear or even irrational outlook. Though the allusions that aim to make an individual feel ashamed do not necessarily have an ethical character, shame is generally seen as an ethical sanction. I analyze the ethicization of aesthetics as well as the aesthetization of ethics, both of which can be due to the confusion of guilt and shame. I ask for a “bracketing” or phenomenological reduction enabling us to look at the phenomenon of shame from the point of view of aesthetics that refrains from ethical judgements. In shame-guilt questions, it is useful to detach aesthetics from ethics: an infraction committed must induce guilt and it is often not necessary to aestheticize the act to induce shame. Not only the aestheticization of ethics should be avoided but also the ethicization of aesthetics. It is possible to view a person’s potentially “shameful” behavior irrespective of ethical questions.