Ibn Rushd on Miracles: Between Natural Law and Public Belief

This article explores the philosophical foundations of religion in Ibn Rushd’s thought, with particular attention to his treatment of miracles. It argues that Ibn Rushd relocates the discussion of miracles from the domain of natural philosophy to that of practical philosophy, where religion fulfills a civic and ethical function by shaping public belief and encouraging virtuous action. The study begins by examining Ibn Rushd’s critical engagement with the Ashʿarī theologians, focusing on his deconstruction of their arguments on miracles and his rejection of al-Ghazālī’s occasionalism in the debate over causality and the proof of miracles. It then turns to Ibn Rushd’s constructive position, which rests on three central elements: first, belief in miracles is fundamental to religious faith and not open to philosophical dispute; second, the miracle that validates prophethood consists in the establishment of divine laws that regulate thought and conduct; and third, this conception is grounded in the Qurʾān, representing the most authentic understanding of revelation. While the primary aim of the article is to clarify Ibn Rushd’s philosophical account of miracles and his reorientation of the debate toward practical philosophy, it also highlights his broader concern with the role of Sharīʿa in guiding communal beliefs and moral practices. This study also brings to light Ibn Rushd’s reliance on tawātur as a form of self-evident knowledge that secures certainty without the need for rational proof.