Contrastive knowledge how

Classical empiricists are notorious for claiming that knowledge-how is a complex disposition or ability that is directly exhibited in action. This dissertation evaluates that claim against the background of contemporary cognitive science. More specifically, it develops a broadly cognitivist theory of knowledge how and argues that this theory outperforms other theories. In the first chapter, I explain and address a key desiderata that any adequate theory of knowledge how should explain, namely novelty. I argue that the argument from versatility of knowledge how needs to start by delineating two aspects of novelty: variability and robustness. I argue that none of the leading theories that have been developed has a convincing reply to the novelty challenge. In the second chapter, I propose an alternative theory, which proposes that understanding practical knowledge requires acknowledging a contrastive dimension. A contrast set (or a set of alternatives) in epistemology refers to a group of propositions or possibilities that are relevant to a specific knowledge claim. When a person knows a fact, they don't just know that one specific thing is true; they also know that certain other possibilities are false. This set of excluded possibilities forms the contrast set. I argue that contrastivism lends itself to an economical account of knowledge how by explaining the other features of knowledge how: gradability, flexibility, generativity. In offering the proposal of contrastive knowledge how, I develop a viable alternative to the intellectualism/anti-intellectualism debate, and I outline a hybrid model of acquisition of knowledge how. The third chapter raises an objection to the contrastive account, about the much discussed thought experiment involving Mary, the color scientist who is confined to a black and white room and the knowledge she acquires when she encounters red for the first time. I reframe the famous Knowledge Argument into what I call the "Surprise Argument," focusing on the surprise and novel insight Mary gains upon seeing red. I provide a contrastive solution to this challenge by proposing that Mary's new knowledge is contrastive in nature--she not only learns what red is but also what it is not, highlighting a relational aspect to perceptual knowledge. I address an objection to applying contrastive knowledge to Mary's case of seeing red for the first time which centers on whether her knowledge of red is inherently singular and non-relational. This objection stems from theories of "quality space" in sensory perception, which argue that sensory experiences are organized by relational contrasts, helping individuals distinguish qualities like color only through perceptual differences. The contrastive proposal suggests that knowledge of a single color can inherently include a capacity to reject non-matches, challenging the necessity of a quality space where knowledge of one color requires knowledge of others. This approach underscores that color knowledge in particular and knowledge how in general involves complex relational processing, where contrastive understanding doesn't always demand explicit comparisons.