Defeat in Mesopotamia

This chapter grapples with the question whether the defeat of the British Indian Army at Kut was inevitable or not? And India’s responsibility for the disaster at Kut is also considered. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first two sections show that certain innovations occurred as regards tactics and operation in Major General Charles Townshend’s force. While the first section details the initial advance from Basra, the second section shows how the lure of Baghdad gradually pulled IEFD towards its nemesis at Kut. The third section portrays the Siege of Kut. The fourth section shows that the relief column failed to relieve Townshend’s besieged force at Kut, because of logistical cum tactical failure. The failure at Kut was caused due to a mix of organizational–logistical–personal failures and also due to certain shortcomings in the field of tactics–operation.