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Probability and Theistic Explanation
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Abstract
The past twenty years have seen a revival of interest in the epistemic of religious belief. Two philosophers who have led the way are Basil Mitchell and Richard Swinburne. Both believe that religious belief can be justified using inductive ‘best explanation’ arguments. However, their similarity ends there. Swinburne’s approach is formal, utilizing the calculus of Bayes’s Theorem in assessing the weight of the evidence; Mitchell’s is informal due to his recognition of judgement as central to such assessment. This book is the first full-length comparison of these two styles of justifying religious belief.
Title: Probability and Theistic Explanation
Description:
Abstract
The past twenty years have seen a revival of interest in the epistemic of religious belief.
Two philosophers who have led the way are Basil Mitchell and Richard Swinburne.
Both believe that religious belief can be justified using inductive ‘best explanation’ arguments.
However, their similarity ends there.
Swinburne’s approach is formal, utilizing the calculus of Bayes’s Theorem in assessing the weight of the evidence; Mitchell’s is informal due to his recognition of judgement as central to such assessment.
This book is the first full-length comparison of these two styles of justifying religious belief.
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