A Theory of Wartime Negotiations

This chapter presents a theory of wartime negotiations that helps to explain when negotiations are likely to occur, as well as what consequences they have for the future trajectory of conflict. It begins with a discussion of how to define negotiations. The chapter then explains the importance of a concept in the study of negotiations known as the reversion outcome. The reversion outcome refers to the best result a negotiator can hope to realize if negotiations do not reach a mutually acceptable agreement. With those ideas established, the chapter enumerates the specific costs and benefits that shape belligerents' calculations regarding wartime diplomacy. A critical cost to starting negotiations is that they can signal weakness to the enemy and one's own constituency. This, in turn, worsens the range of outcomes a belligerent can obtain when negotiations fail, since abortive talks are likely to be followed by an emboldened enemy or political punishment. The chapter also differentiates between sincere negotiations and insincere negotiations. Finally, it looks at two key factors that help to explain the specific balance of costs and benefits that belligerents perceive when considering when and how to negotiate during war: the level of latent diplomatic pressure that can be activated and placed on belligerents by third parties, and the degree of information culled from fighting.