Javascript must be enabled to continue!
Don't Budge! The Reputational Cost of Political Compromises
View through CrossRef
How do citizens evaluate political parties’ willingness to compromise during coalition negotiations in representative democracies? While previous research has shown that citizens support the principle of political compromise, it remains unclear how parties’ compromise acceptance during coalition negotiations affects the voters’ trust. We argue that parties incur substantial reputational costs when they are willing to compromise during coalition negotiations. We use a pre-registered survey experiment in Germany fielded immediately after the 2021 parliamentary elections (\texttt{N=7,562}) to isolate the effect of parties’ decision to compromise or not from success or failure in the negotiations. Our findings reveal that voters place more trust in their parties when they remain steadfast during negotiations. Highly principled individuals and those with low social trust are particularly likely to reject compromising parties. Given the centrality of compromise in representative democracy, these findings suggest that political distrust may be a systemic component of representative democracy.
Title: Don't Budge! The Reputational Cost of Political Compromises
Description:
How do citizens evaluate political parties’ willingness to compromise during coalition negotiations in representative democracies? While previous research has shown that citizens support the principle of political compromise, it remains unclear how parties’ compromise acceptance during coalition negotiations affects the voters’ trust.
We argue that parties incur substantial reputational costs when they are willing to compromise during coalition negotiations.
We use a pre-registered survey experiment in Germany fielded immediately after the 2021 parliamentary elections (\texttt{N=7,562}) to isolate the effect of parties’ decision to compromise or not from success or failure in the negotiations.
Our findings reveal that voters place more trust in their parties when they remain steadfast during negotiations.
Highly principled individuals and those with low social trust are particularly likely to reject compromising parties.
Given the centrality of compromise in representative democracy, these findings suggest that political distrust may be a systemic component of representative democracy.
Related Results
Reputation and cooperation in social dilemma games
Reputation and cooperation in social dilemma games
A human solution to the problem of cooperation is the maintenance of informal reputation hierarchies. Reputational information contributes to cooperation by providing guidelines ab...
A Catalogue of the Egyptian Collection in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge
A Catalogue of the Egyptian Collection in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge
Since the first donations of Egyptian artefacts to the Fitzwilliam Museum, including the sarcophagus lid of Rameses III donated in 1823, its ancient Egyptian holdings have grown st...
Goal inference in moral narratives
Goal inference in moral narratives
We often form beliefs about others based on narratives they tell about their own moral actions. When constructing such moral narratives, narrators balance multiple goals, such as c...
Mazzinianesimo, fascismo, comunismo: l'itinerario politico di Delio Cantimori (1919-1943)
Mazzinianesimo, fascismo, comunismo: l'itinerario politico di Delio Cantimori (1919-1943)
Delio Cantimori (1904-1966) was one of the most important Italian historians of the twentieth century. His studies on sixteenth-century religious history, on Italian 'Jacobinism' a...
Information-making-related information needs and the credibility of information
Information-making-related information needs and the credibility of information
Introduction. Even if trust in the process of how information is made has been acknowledged as a key aspect of the credibility of information, there is little earlier research on h...
Social Networks and Nonlegal Sanctions: Compliance with International Courts
Social Networks and Nonlegal Sanctions: Compliance with International Courts
Most international courts do not have effective mechanisms for enforcing compliance with their judgments and yet many of those judgments are nevertheless complied with. The reason ...
CORPORATE REPUTATIONAL LOSS AND REGULATORY SANCTIONS IN SECURITIES MARKET: THEORY, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, AND ENFORCEMENT IN VIETNAM
CORPORATE REPUTATIONAL LOSS AND REGULATORY SANCTIONS IN SECURITIES MARKET: THEORY, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, AND ENFORCEMENT IN VIETNAM
This paper reviews key perspectives on corporate reputation and reputational loss, followed by an analysis of Vietnam’s regulatory framework and enforcement practices in the securi...
The Dominance of Liking: Uncovering Dyadic and Reputational Effects of Peer and Perceived Teacher Likes and Dislikes on Friendship Dynamics Among Chinese Adolescents
The Dominance of Liking: Uncovering Dyadic and Reputational Effects of Peer and Perceived Teacher Likes and Dislikes on Friendship Dynamics Among Chinese Adolescents
Abstract
While previous research suggests that peer and teacher preferences are linked to adolescents’ peer relationships, the specific impact of peer and teacher (dis)li...

