Multi-Hazard Impacts and Cascading Risks in Energy Systems 

Here we examine the interrelationships between 30 natural hazard types and 13 energy system components. Energy systems are increasingly exposed to natural hazards that are becoming more frequent, intense, and interconnected under climate change. These hazards rarely occur in isolation. Single events and compound events can trigger cascading impacts that spread across energy generation, transmission, distribution, storage, and end-use demand, often resulting in large-scale power outages and long recovery times. However, many existing studies focus on individual hazards or isolated energy components, which limits understanding of system-wide risk. This study presents a structured synthesis of multi-hazard impacts on energy systems using a hazard–energy interrelationship framework. Based on a systematic review of 219 sources, including peer-reviewed literature, technical reports, and documented real-world events, we examine 30 natural hazard types across atmospheric, hydroclimatic, geophysical, environmental, and space-related categories. For each natural hazard type, we examine its potential influence on 13 different key energy system components, including power generation, transmission and distribution networks, storage systems, and energy demand. Each of the 390 (30x13) potential hazard–energy interrelationships is classified with their potential to cause one of the following: direct physical damage, increased probability of failure, both, or neither. We include both interrelationships that are evidenced by those that have occurred and evidenced in the literature, as well as those that theoretically might occur. Of the potential 390 natural hazard-energy system component interrelationships, we find 5 (1.3%) interrelationships as direct impacts, 11 (2.8%) with increased probability of influencing an impact, 181 (46.4%) with both direct and increased probability, and 193 (49.5%) with no interrelationships. We find that all energy system components are exposed to at least three hazard types, except cooling demand, which is exposed to only two hazard types, and that cascading impacts are common across the energy supply chain. We found that, by hazard group, the following percentages of interrelationships were identified (expressed as a proportion of the total possible hazard–energy component interrelationships within each hazard group): geophysical (65%), atmospheric (52%), environmental (50%), hydroclimatic (44%), space (28%). Case studies of catastrophic power outages, such as the February 2021 Texas (USA) cold wave, which included a storm and floods, illustrate how failures in power generation can rapidly propagate through transmission and distribution networks and interact with extreme demand conditions. Beyond single-hazard perspectives, this framework highlights key interdependencies and vulnerabilities in energy systems and supports integrated approaches for early warning, resilience planning, and decision support. The findings are directly relevant to initiatives and broader discussions on multi-hazard risk and energy system resilience.