The Issuant Conception of Hell

Abstract In a recent philosophy of religion class, a student queried why, on usual theistic conceptions, God’s desire that we share eternity with him does not violate the Kantian moral requirement: not to treat persons as a mere means to one’s own ends. I responded by outlining the usual theistic reply to this question, that sharing eternity with God is the best thing that could happen to anyone, and one does not treat a person as a mere means to one’s own ends when one is pursuing what is best for that person. This reply left another student troubled. His immediate response was, “But why does he get so angry, then, when we just want to be left alone?” This question succinctly summarizes a host of problems that arise on the standard conception of hell, problems ranging from some apparent vindictiveness on the part of God when sending someone to hell, to an inadequate account of why there is no third alternative, perhaps less blessed than heaven but more convenient than hell. What is most important about the question, however, is not the rang1 of problems it raises, but something deeper. The heart of the question centers on the picture of God’s motivations as presented by Christians who hold a traditional conception of hell in explaining presence in heaven versus presence in hell. The question is rooted in perplexity as to why there is such a dramatic shift from the motivation of love in the one case to the motivation of retribution or vindictiveness in the other.