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Title: World View
Description:
John Latham.

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A Hybrid View
A Hybrid View
This chapter presents a hybrid view of color that depends on a view of objective color that can be called “the multiple-aspect view.” The multiple-aspect view of color holds that w...
Encyclopedia of the FIFA World Cup
Encyclopedia of the FIFA World Cup
Every four years, the FIFA World Cup captures the global imagination like no other sporting spectacle. With a cumulative television audience of several billion people tuning in to ...
Ajax
Ajax
The first chapter introduces the story of Ajax to help illustrate three philosophical positions on shame: the traditional view, the naturalistic view, and the pessimistic view. It ...
The Metaphor View
The Metaphor View
Chapter 6 presents the view that psychological terms in these unexpected contexts are used metaphorically. It argues that there is no independent, non-question-begging evidence tha...
The pathways for perception
The pathways for perception
Chapter 2 outlines some of the evidence on which the seemingly strong standard view has been based. The early discovery that ventral nerve roots of the spinal cord provide a motor ...
Daily Life through World History in Primary Documents
Daily Life through World History in Primary Documents
Who did the ancient Greeks describe as the world's best athlete? What does the Koran say about women's rights? How has the digital revolution changed life in the modern age? From t...
The role of the brain
The role of the brain
This chapter introduces two interpretations of how we know about the world. One, the standard, sensory-to-motor view, is that physical actions for sounds, lights, tastes, smells, a...
Presentationalism
Presentationalism
This chapter explores the view—“presentationalism”—that normative sentences and propositions are mind-independently true, but what they represent is not normative. There are no nor...

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