Alethic nihilism against paradox

Abstract Chapter 2 introduces the Liar paradox, and explains how nihilism solves it. It then introduces a variety of other paradoxes concerning truth, such as Curry’s paradox and Yablo’s paradox. It also addresses the objection that, since the nihilist holds that nothing is true, they are committed to rejecting every claim. There is an Aristotelian argument that anyone who endorses the law of excluded middle is committed to bivalence. Nihilism endorses the former but rejects the latter, so the argument is an objection to nihilism; the chapter shows how rejecting propositions of the form <<p> is true iff p> defuses the argument. The chapter also contains an extended discussion of the Truth-teller and related ‘paradoxes of underdetermination’. It first discusses in detail what problem these cases raise, before showing how nihilism resolves these paradoxes.