Search engine for discovering works of Art, research articles, and books related to Art and Culture
ShareThis
Javascript must be enabled to continue!

Polished Artifacts, Fragile Engagement? Tackling the Challenge of Reduced Epistemic Effort in Human-AI Knowledge Construction

View through CrossRef
Learning and knowledge construction are socially organized processes of meaning-making that rely on co-regulation and epistemic agency. Over the past decades, research in Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL) has developed a rich theoretical repertoire to explain how these processes emerge through mediated interaction. This article revisits these foundational assumptions against the background of people’s use of generative AI (genAI). As epistemic processes are increasingly supported by genAI, we realize a risk of superficial understanding and the illusion of comprehension. While genAI can efficiently produce and refine knowledge-related artifacts, it may simultaneously reduce human epistemic effort by shifting regulatory and evaluative processes toward the AI. Drawing on CSCL theories and research traditions, we conceptualize this risk through two different strands: a social-cognitive and an artifact-oriented account. The social-cognitive strand is grounded in automation bias, that is, people’s systematic tendency to attribute greater epistemic competence to AI systems than to themselves. This shift may weaken shared regulation, transactivity, and epistemic agency. The artifact-oriented strand focuses on the epistemic properties of polished external artifacts that resemble finalized products rather than provisional drafts. Such artifacts may induce a sense of epistemic closure, reducing cognitive conflicts and deeper elaboration. We describe these intricacies as key challenges for the next phase of CSCL research and appeal to structure AI participation in ways that preserve conflict and iterative refinement by conceptualizing AI as an argumentative partner or epistemic challenger to enhance epistemic quality without diminishing human epistemic effort.
Center for Open Science
Title: Polished Artifacts, Fragile Engagement? Tackling the Challenge of Reduced Epistemic Effort in Human-AI Knowledge Construction
Description:
Learning and knowledge construction are socially organized processes of meaning-making that rely on co-regulation and epistemic agency.
Over the past decades, research in Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL) has developed a rich theoretical repertoire to explain how these processes emerge through mediated interaction.
This article revisits these foundational assumptions against the background of people’s use of generative AI (genAI).
As epistemic processes are increasingly supported by genAI, we realize a risk of superficial understanding and the illusion of comprehension.
While genAI can efficiently produce and refine knowledge-related artifacts, it may simultaneously reduce human epistemic effort by shifting regulatory and evaluative processes toward the AI.
Drawing on CSCL theories and research traditions, we conceptualize this risk through two different strands: a social-cognitive and an artifact-oriented account.
The social-cognitive strand is grounded in automation bias, that is, people’s systematic tendency to attribute greater epistemic competence to AI systems than to themselves.
This shift may weaken shared regulation, transactivity, and epistemic agency.
The artifact-oriented strand focuses on the epistemic properties of polished external artifacts that resemble finalized products rather than provisional drafts.
Such artifacts may induce a sense of epistemic closure, reducing cognitive conflicts and deeper elaboration.
We describe these intricacies as key challenges for the next phase of CSCL research and appeal to structure AI participation in ways that preserve conflict and iterative refinement by conceptualizing AI as an argumentative partner or epistemic challenger to enhance epistemic quality without diminishing human epistemic effort.

Related Results

Epistemic Injustice or Epistemic Oppression?
Epistemic Injustice or Epistemic Oppression?
The concepts of epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression both aim to track obstacles to epistemic agencyーi.e., forms of epistemic exclusionーthat are undue and persistent. Indee...
Temas Epistêmicos, não Epistêmicos no Ensino
Temas Epistêmicos, não Epistêmicos no Ensino
Resumo A Epistemologia da Ciência é um campo de estudo que permite analisar o desenvolvimento da ciência em uma postura dialética, que qualifica as questões internas à Ciência, rel...
Epistemic Injustice
Epistemic Injustice
<p>“Epistemic injustice” is a fairly new concept in philosophy, which, loosely speaking, describes a kind of injustice that occurs at the intersection of structures of the so...
The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
Abstract Ideally, we would have beliefs that satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as fostering the acquisition, retention and use of other relevant inform...
Epistemic Defence-in-Depth in Mature Safety Regimes
Epistemic Defence-in-Depth in Mature Safety Regimes
Safety governance in high-hazard systems increasingly emphasizes explicit treatment of uncertainty and the strength of knowledge. Yet major accidents continue to reveal a persisten...
Bioethics-CSR Divide
Bioethics-CSR Divide
Photo by Sean Pollock on Unsplash ABSTRACT Bioethics and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) were born out of similar concerns, such as the reaction to scandal and the restraint ...
Epistemic relativism
Epistemic relativism
Broadly speaking, relativism is the view that, at least in some domains, everything or every truth is relative to some standards so that, when two or more people disagree about the...

Back to Top