De-Lock-In: Veto Network Neutralization and the End of Military-Technological Lock-In

Path dependence theory explains why incumbent technologies persist. It does not explain how persistence ends. This paper proposes a termination mechanism for technological lock-in in weapon systems under concentrated state procurement: veto network neutralization. Incumbent weapon systems generate stakeholder networks that possess institutional control over procurement, doctrine, and career advancement. Technical superiority of alternatives is insufficient to overcome this veto capacity. Transition occurs when incumbent stakeholders lose formal control at institutional veto nodes-and when sufficient replacement capacity exists to absorb the shift. The paper demonstrates this mechanism through four cases: the English longbow-to-firearm transition (1340-1595), the battleship-to-aircraft carrier transition (1918-1942), the sail-to-steam naval transition (1815-1860), and the heavy cavalry-to-infantry firearms transition in early modern Europe. Each case exhibits a characteristic temporal signature: a long lag between technical feasibility and adoption while veto networks remain intact, followed by rapid adoption once veto capacity is neutralized, with post-neutralization tempo mediated by replacement capacity. The mechanism is conditional, operating only in paradigmatic transitions under concentrated procurement authority, and falsifiable, generating testable predictions about timing, tempo, and comparative variation.