Wittgensteinian Perspectives on the Concept of Grammar

This paper examines the meaning Ludwig Wittgenstein assigns to the concept of "grammar" in his late philosophy, a notion both close to and distinct from its common usage in linguistics or philology. Grammar, in his view, refers both to the project of describing the use and rules of language, and to the rules themselves. As such, grammar is the system of rules that makes meaning possible, and it is intersubjective, implicit, and non-theoretical in nature. Grammatical remarks or propositions‒unlike empirical ones ‒ do not convey new information, but clarify what is already operative in ordinary language use. Through concrete examples ‒ such as the analysis of the proposition "I am here" ‒ this paper shows how removing utterances from their context of use leads to philosophical confusion. From this perspective, Wittgensteinian grammar does not propose-a theory of language, but a form of recollection aimed at restoring clarity in the face of the fascination exerted by our ways of speaking.