The U.S. Marine Corps’ Tank Doctrine, 1920–50

Major Joseph DiDomenico’s study of U.S. Army influence on U.S. Marine Corps tank doctrine appeared in the Summer 2018 issue of this journal, titled “The U.S. Army’s Influence on Marine Corps Tank Doctrine.” Mobilizing an impressive array of primary and secondary sources, DiDomenico laid considerable credit for the Corps’ improvements to its nascent World War II tank and amphibious tractor doctrine on the Army’s Armor School at Fort Knox as well as the improved Army doctrinal publications that had emerged by 1944. Major DiDomenico excoriated the Marine Corps’ neglect of “critical vulnerabilities for armor supporting amphibious operations.” The benchmark for Marine Corps tank doctrine’s failures to “synthesize” Army tank doctrine for Marine Corps missions is unsurprisingly the Battle of Tarawa. According to DiDomenico, the failures registered at Tarawa “indicated an institutional ignorance in the operational art of combined arms.” This article presents some common misconceptions of Marine Corps tank policy and doctrine and aims to correct those misconceptions.