Vietnam in U.S.-Soviet Back Channels, November 1971–April 1972

This chapter examines the centrality of Vietnam in U.S.-Soviet back channels. By 1971, the White House had used a combination of private and public channels to convey to the Kremlin the deadlocked status of the secret negotiations in Paris between the United States and North Vietnam. The Channel became the primary means to telegraph American intentions, simultaneously applying pressure on the Soviets to restrain the North Vietnamese while warning that there would be serious consequences and drastic action on the part of the United States in the event of a North Vietnamese offensive. In early 1972, Nixon further consolidated the control of the entire U.S.-Soviet relationship, to the point of preparing sanitized versions of communications with the Soviets for Secretary of State Rogers. The Channel and the Nixon-Brezhnev exchanges allowed both sides to preview, state, and reinforce policy goals. Back channels also ensured that Kissinger and Dobrynin became personally vested in the détente policy of their respective governments, to the point of consulting each other to mitigate the adverse impact of decisions and public pronouncements. Despite attempts to link a Vietnam settlement to U.S.-Soviet détente, Nixon’s and Brezhnev’s eventual willingness to consider Vietnam outside of U.S.-Soviet relations allowed détente to proceed.