The epistemological anarchism of Feyerabend in the paradigm of post-classical science

The subject of the research is Paul Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism in the context of the post-nonclassical science paradigm. The article explores how the critique of methodological monism, put forward by the Austrian-American philosopher during the era of nonclassical science, gains new relevance under conditions of post-nonclassical scientific rationality. The author analyzes Feyerabend's concept of counter-rules, the principle of "anything goes," and the defense of knowledge pluralism as methodological tools opposing the universalizing claims of classical and nonclassical philosophy of science. The philosophical foundations of the critique of scientific imperialism are examined, paradoxes of paradigm incommensurability are revealed, and the relationship between methodological plurality and the demands of scientific responsibility in the era of digital transformation is analyzed. The subject also encompasses the reevaluation of Feyerabend's ideas in light of contemporary approaches—ranging from actor-network theories and decolonial epistemologies to the analysis of artificial intelligence as a pseudo-anarchist form of knowledge. The methodology is based on a philosophical analysis of Feyerabend's historical and philosophical legacy in dialogue with modern epistemological approaches. A comprehensive method is applied, integrating historical-critical analysis, comparative study of concepts, phenomenological reflection, and critical interpretation of texts in the framework of post-nonclassical thought. The scientific novelty of the research lies in demonstrating that Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism should be viewed not as a historical position from the 20th century, but as a meta-methodology relevant to post-nonclassical science, with its principled plurality, context-dependence, and inseparability of subject-object relations. This article systematically correlates anarchist philosophy with the challenges of the digital age for the first time, including the issues of artificial intelligence as a pseudo-anarchist form of knowledge. The main findings are: 1) Feyerabend's critique of methodological monism gains new epistemic validity in the post-nonclassical context; 2) anarchism functions as a philosophical strategy for the decolonization of knowledge and overcoming epistemological hegemony; 3) overcoming the limitations of Feyerabend's approach requires the development of a concept of responsible pluralism accompanied by mechanisms of ethical accountability; 4) the dialogue between anarchism and machine cognition reveals the necessity of preserving the human, intentional dimension of scientific creativity under conditions of the automation of epistemic processes.