Affect and Prosocial Responding

Abstract Prosocial behavior, defined as voluntary behavior intended to benefit another (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998), has been a topic of psychological interest for some time but especially since the late 1960s. Much of the work on this topic has pertained to the role of sociocognitive skills, situational and socialization influences in the development or maintenance of prosocial behavior (Dovidio, 1984; Eisenberg, 1986; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Krebs & Miller, 1985; Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chapman, 1983). However, unlike in the study of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1969, 1984), emotion also has played an important role in theory and research on prosocial behavior. The role of emotion in prosocial behavior has been considered primarily in theory and research pertaining to two types of potential motivators: empathy and mood. Affectively based empathy has been viewed as the basis for much prosocial behavior for decades (e.g., Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1975). Thus, researchers have investigated the role of empathy-related responses both in the development of prosocial responding and in individual differences in prosocial behavior. In contrast, temporary positive and negative mood states have been examined primarily as situational factors that affect the likelihood of individuals performing prosocial behaviors. These bodies of work are reviewed in this chapter, as well as work linking self-conscious emotions and dispositional emotionality to empathy-related and prosocial responding. As defined herein, prosocial behavior is mute about an actor’s motivation for assisting. Yet psychologists generally have been interested in the motives behind prosocial actions. Helping behavior motivated by self-interest usually is valued less than helping motivated by moral values or concern for another. Based on this interest in motivation, altruism has been differentiated from other types of prosocial behaviors. Altruism often is defined as intrinsically motivated, voluntary behaviors intended to benefit others—prosocial behaviors motivated by internal motives, such as concern for others or internalized values, goals, and self-rewards, rather than by the expectation of concrete or social rewards (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). There is disagreement in regard to whether even altruism actually is motivated by self-rewards or whether altruism can be motivated by moral values (Batson, 1991; Batson, 1998; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997), but these issues are not central to the focus of this chapter and are not discussed further.