Beyond “Dreydegger”: The Future of Anglo-American Existential Phenomenology

AbstractAlthough there are many philosophers responsible for introducing phenomenology to philosophy departments in the United States and United Kingdom (e.g. Charles Taylor and Richard Rorty), arguably none has been as broadly influential as Hubert Dreyfus (1929–2017). It may not be too much of an exaggeration to claim (as some have; see Kelly, 2005), that the reading of Heidegger taught in most philosophy departments in the English-speaking world is some descendent of Dreyfus’s Heidegger—or “Dreydegger” as it is sometimes called. This portmanteau is at once a term of endearment and of derision. The union of the two thinkers represents some of the best of Dreyfus’s personal contributions to philosophy: the willingness to look to philosophical texts of the past for insights that can help untangle current theoretical problems; and the boldness in appropriating and reimagining the thinking of one of the most influential thinkers of the past century. But the term also stands for a certain style of reading texts in the history of philosophy that, some argue, gives short shrift to the historical context of the thinking that went into it, the life and legacy of the philosopher who wrote it, and most starkly, the original intentions of the text itself. As Marjorie Grene, a contemporary and colleague, remarked, Dreyfus “purveys his Heidegger, not wholly uncritically, but with deep intellectual passion and undoubted pedagogical brilliance to all—hundreds a year—who come to listen, and uses that Heidegger, in turn, for his own philosophical purposes” (Grene, 1976: 33).