Divergências jusfilosóficas entre Francisco Suárez e Tomás de Aquino na razão prática, segundo John Finnis

This study analyzes the presence of Francisco Suárez in the thought of John Finnis, whose vast work is of singular importance in proposing, alongside other authors, a new reading of Thomas Aquinas in the field of practical philosophy. In particular, in the field of law, it deserves to be highlighted for reinserting questions relating to natural law into the contemporary jusphilosophical debate. It is divided into sections, each dealing with one of the two central points of disagreement between John Finnis and Francisco Suárez. Firstly, the violation of the irreducibility of orders of knowledge. And then, the source or nature of the obligation (moral and legal). As for the methodology, a comprehensive bibliographical survey is used, analyzing primary sources of the authors studied and secondary sources of their contemporary commentators for an in-depth understanding of the subject. In the end, it is concluded that Francisco Suárez identifies in the rational nature of the human being the basis for the agent to be able to identify right and wrong in human action, as well as maintaining that the source or nature of obligation lies in the will, and not in reason, negating the thesis of Thomas Aquinas.